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Historical Israel-Arab wars Discuss the strategies and the situation of the historical Israeli-Arab wars from 1948-1982 and it's implications on Israel.

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  #21  
Old 02-05-2009, 01:31 AM
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Even before the start of the war, that's water under the bridge, or the horse out of the barn. We know now that MI was faulty to begin with. Maybe not the data itslef, but the assessments and conclusions were too politically influenced, rather than data driven. All I'm doing is endorsing Peled's determinations.

My issue with the IAF's plans would be that in order to get to the SAMs at that stage, they would have been left open to attacks by the 2 air forces. Not enough to do damage (the way the SAMs did) but enough to disrupt the taking out of the umbrellas.

IMHO it comes back to going against the training and plans of even a flawed doctrine. Why hold at the canal instead of drawing the Egyptians in? Instead the IDF had to juggle extended supply lines, vulnerable positions including CCC at Refidim, the morale isse of the isolated mutzavim, and an armour doctrine shot to hell by RPGs and Saggers.
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  #22  
Old 06-30-2010, 04:58 PM
tzvika tzvika is offline
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Default Question about Yom Kippur war Reply to Thread

In my humble opinion, the decision not to make a preentive strike was a political one that cost us dearly in human life and sacrifice.
I can attest that the Army was fully aware of the impending attack prior to October 6th, i was at home on leave that week from my post in Sharem Ha Sheich, in Sinai, and i was called Friday evening at 2200, when i arrived to a meeting point for a reserves batallion( not my own) we were briefed of the opening of hostilities between 1400 to 1800 on Saturday Yom Kippur day.
Yes there were allot of mistakes and also some degree of over confidence about the capabilities of the Arab Armies, but i think that the personal courage, inventive,initiative and knoledge that there is not a second line of defence to withdraw to, did give the Israelies the edge, the fact is that the Egytian Army was able to occupy only about seven Kms inland from the Suez Canal, and after a few days (very hard) of combat the Egyptian Army as a fighting force was completely in shambles.
That is my humble opinion, i was there, i fought , i survived, many did not.
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  #23  
Old 06-30-2010, 11:56 PM
Familyguydude Familyguydude is offline
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One thing I haven't seen mentioned here yet, is they very important role played by Aman in the faulty intelligence argument. From I remember from Abraham Rabinovich's book on the Yom Kippur War (a very good book for anyone seeking a complete and comprehensive history on the war and its causes and outcomes) much of the blame was placed on the intelligence communities failure to come to a precise agreement on if the threat was a cocrete one or just a ploy. From within the intelligence community, there was a heavy devide. Aman, for its part, was the key ingredient in Israel intelligence failure. Described by Rabinovich as heavily illfitrated by the arragont "invincible" Israelis who truly believed the Arab armies wouldn't dare assault Israel after its stunning defeat in 67. Where I think your drawing you confusion from, is that you believed Meir had fully come to the conclusion that the Arab forces were bound to invade when she rejected preemption. Remember, the intellegence community was split. Mossad believed the Arab invasion was immenent and called for fulll reserve mobalization (if my memory serves me). And thats why reserves were called up the first time, which exhausted Israel financialy. (Remember that calling up reserves; drawing the vast majority of Israel's working population to war was very expensive). Yet Aman was hell bent on claiming that its intelligence proved that the Arab menuveres were just sword ratalling. With a split intelligence community, it seems the Israeli political leaders were also split. With such a split, it seems as if the government decided on making a compromise and initiating a limited call up of reserves. This coupled with the fact that the Bar-Lev line was expected to withstand an attack a lot stronger than it actually could have, provided for a gloom start to the last Arab-Israeli war. Or at least, thats what I can recall was Rabinovich's basic argument.
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  #24  
Old 07-01-2010, 01:01 AM
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tzvika--thanks for reviving an interesting thread.

I believe Israel made three basic mistakes in planning leading up to 1973:

1. Israel's prediction of whether the Arabs would attack was based on just one factor: whether the Egyptian air force was capable of confronting the Israeli air force. But in fact, forecasts based on just single truth often find themselves outmaneuvered by a determined enemy who will look for alternative means. Which brings me to the second point, the determined enemy.

2. With the experience of 1967 (which is often considered an accidental or unintentional war) behind them, Israel's leaders were very concerned with not doing anything which could trigger another conflict. But this "sympathy" with their enemy contrasts sharply with Israel's failure to understand that Sadat had painted himself into a corner with his constant statements that "this is the year of decision", and thus felt he ultimately had to do something or else become the laughingstock of the Arab world. (I worry what Erdogan may feel obligated to do now, in this same sense.)

3. Because of 1 and 2 above, along with the economic costs of mobilization, Israel had come to demand unambiguous confirmation that an attack was underway before taking any defensive steps. Unfortunately, unambiguous confirmation left too little time to effectively prepare.
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  #25  
Old 09-14-2013, 02:33 PM
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Arrow Link of Interest

http://www.chabad.org/therebbe/artic...ink-of-War.htm
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  #26  
Old 09-14-2013, 06:10 PM
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1] Get to the bottom of King Hussein's visit to Tel Aviv and his meeting with Golda after the last Arab summit.

2] Understand that Golda and Dayan and others had a good sense of the Egyptians and Syrians in the past, but they had not kept up with the changes, sometimes rapid, in the Arab armed forces.

3] The lower ranking officers had more of a sense of things than the senior colonels and especially generals who had moved up into the offices and out of the field.

4] It is how you finish that really counts, and for all the criticism that can be made--and should be made--when the IDF went into high gear it reversed loses and took the battle over to Syria, and and into Africa and Egypt-proper.

5] Sadat engaged in an "ego" war, with limited goals. He went too far, against his generals' best advice, lost a huge number of tanks needlessly, and ended up with an army surrounded, and Sharon in Africa. He should have stayed along the canal.

6] Syria also had limited aims. Both Assad and Sadat wanted to recapture significant land before the fabled Israel reserve system kicked-in. When it did, Syria was unprepared.

Never underestimate fighting for survival, as Israel did in '73, and fighting to satisfy an ego bruised by loss of land to an enemy in '67 in a war for the of destruction of Israel that you thought you wanted. Personally, I find Sadat's actions dishonourable, as he ended up killing thousands of his own soldiers, and Israel soldiers, and he cocked-up the war begging for the Soviets to get a cease-fire declaration.

Obviously the biggest lesson was, to the Intel people and the senior generals, was not to assume that past wisdom applies to today's situation. Behaviour and motivation and technique can all change, and can do so rapidly. Soviet technology took a large toll of Israel aircraft and tanks, which was not properly anticipated.

The Agranat Commission was impaneled in late November of 1973, only days after the war wound down.

While neither Egypt nor Syria was in a position for all-out war with Israel, our Intel did not figure that the Arabs would strike with a limited goal, and the backing of the Soviet Union, and plans to call a cease-fire with advantageous lines in Sinai and Golan. If Sadat hadn't pushed his general in Sinai to advance into an Israel trap, he would have met his limited goals admirably. Syria was too laden down by sluggish Soviet-style fighting, while flexible, often autonomous small units of Israeli armour wreaked havoc on Syria's more modern tanks. Syrian break-through was not followed-up well.

There is clearly a lack of agreement among the various well-written books on a number of important details. The role of King Hussein and his warning to Golda of impending war probably being the biggest.
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  #27  
Old 09-15-2013, 11:26 AM
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My interest was piqued yet again when Israel commented this week that they saw no benefit to shortening the 50 year freeze on certain information about the war.

Only ten more years to go!
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  #28  
Old 09-15-2013, 12:39 PM
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And Rafi, you can bet it is the role of Israel's sometime "secret ally" King Hussein and his meeting with Golda shortly before the war broke out that is being kept under wraps.

Of course many believe Hussein was a destabilizer who used his long-cultivated open lines to Israel to feed disinformation. Yet if that was the case I doubt Mr Hussein would have died king of his British-created artificial state originally called Transjordanian Palestine, and once promised to a future Jewish state. For all the heat and son of Amman, the little king spend most of his life slip-sliding unsurely on thin ice. That took a lot of skill, I'll grant. A lesser man would have collapsed early on in his reign. But Israel functioned as an ally to Hussein, if semi-secretly, and he definitely played some critical role in the War of Atonement. I, too, would love to know all the sequestered records, and the role of the monarch of the House of Hashem (what an ironic dynastic name!) of Mecca.
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  #29  
Old 09-15-2013, 04:21 PM
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Arrow Where might we have met

Quote:
Originally Posted by rafi View Post
Paparock,

I just spoke to that point in the other thread about the YK War. The proximity in time between the rumor starting that Israel was fueling missiles and the time the airlifts began was an amazing coincidence.

Not that I'm suggesting a confirmation of anything you spoke of as being true, but did we meet in Wichita Falls during the time you described? I may or may not have been there in the early 70s training on equipment that may or may not ever have been given to the IAF.

I'm slow sometimes Rafi. I just found this post you made back in 2008.

Wow, you were in Texas back in the early 70s? I was in Wichita Falls a lot during those years. Where might I have met you? PM me.
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  #30  
Old 10-27-2014, 07:46 PM
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Lightbulb 1973 Yom Kippur War - Golan Heights Tank Battle

1973 Yom Kippur War - Golan Heights Tank Battle



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